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What does it mean to be an American? What (if any) "sacred ties"
bind us together as a special people with a special destiny? And what is
the proper place for quasi-religious icons, like the flag, and creedal affir-
mations, like the Pledge of Allegiance, in constituting ourselves as a spe-
cial community? These timely questions have been sharply posed in
recent months by the presidential campaign of George Bush, a proud,
albeit adopted, son of the Lone Star state. But these questions are more
than timely-they are timeless. Indeed, months before the general elec-
tion took shape, these and related questions were posed with even more
crispness-and with far more elegance, eloquence, and thoughtfuilness-
by another adopted son of Texas, Professor Sanford Levinson.1
At the outset of his book Constitutional Faith, Professor Levinson
promises "many more questions than answers in the pages to come" 2 -
and he is true to his word. This book is not for those who seek quick
solutions to deep issues. But for those who savor seriousness and sincer-
ity, for those left unsatisfied by the recent campaign's fast-food, thirty-
second-ad-bite approach to enduring questions of American identity,
Constitutional Faith is appetizing and nourishing fare. The book, how-
ever, will leave some readers, especially lawyers, hungry for more-more
determinacy, more answers, more traditional legal analysis, more atten-
tion to legal process concerns-than Professor Levinson has chosen to
serve up.
In Part I of this Review, I present a detailed account of Professor
Levinson's arguments. In Part II, I offer a few of my reactions.
f Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.
t Hereinafter cited by page number only.
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1984, Yale University.





I. The Words of Levinson's Mouth
As suggested by the book's title, Professor Levinson's central goal is
to explore the idea of American "civil religion ' 3 by making "clearer the
ambiguities of 'constitutional faith,' i.e., wholehearted attachment to the
Constitution as the center of one's (and ultimately the nation's) political
life."'4 What follows is not the kind of traditional "linear argument
aimed at moving the reader toward some purportedly ineluctable conclu-
sions (e.g., 'this, and this alone, is the one best way to perceive the Con-
stitution')" 5 that characterizes much contemporary constitutional
scholarship. 6 Rather, Professor Levinson offers a series of musings and
meditations on interrelated aspects of constitutional faith. The book thus
reads less like a conventional exercise in constitutional theory and more
like a collection of sermons on various questions raised by the book's
terse yet rich title. And as a sermon, each chapter has considerable vir-
tue. Levinson is always sincere7 and at times soul-bearing, erudite in the
wide range of thinkers (both within law and beyond) whom he quotes
and discusses, and elegant in his imagery and prose.
Chapter one begins with a dextrous weaving of quotations
suggesting
the key role that the Constitution [has] played within the structure
of the American "civil religion," that web of understandings,
myths, symbols, and documents out of which would be woven in-
terpretive narratives both placing within history and normatively
justifying the new American community coming into being follow-
ing the travails of the Revolution.8
Levinson argues that most observers have missed much of the signifi-
cance of the phenomenon of "civil religion" by emphasizing only the
Constitution's "integrative function" 9-its ability as a symbol to "'sup-
ply an overarching sense of unity even in a society otherwise riddled with
3. See p. 10.
4. P. 4.
5. P. 6.
6. See, e.g., C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY
(1960); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
7. Cf. p. 172 ("Sincerity-or intellectual honesty-may be a sine qua non of professing ....
8. P. 10. Levinson compares Jefferson's criticism of those who show "'sanctimonious rever-
ence'" for the Constitution, see p. 9 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval
(July 12, 1816), reprinted in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 37, 42 (P. Ford ed. 1899)), with
Madison's view that "great charters" of government are worthy objects of reverence, see p. 10 (quot-
ing Madison, Charters, Nat'l Gazette, Jan. 19, 1792, at 94, col. 4, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 192 (R. Rutland ed. 1983)).
9. P. 15. Levinson credits Rousseau with this theory. P. 15; see J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL




conflict.' "10 For Levinson, this approach "overlooks the fact that reli-
gion, especially over the past 500 years, has served much more as a
source of deep cleavage than of unity."1 Indeed, Levinson argues that
traditional sources of religious schism have parallels in "many classic
constitutional controversies." 12 To illustrate this insight, he sets out a
stylized dichotomy between "Protestantism" and "Catholicism" in West-
ern religious thought, a dichotomy reflected in the different answers that
these two traditions have proffered to two fundamental questions. First,
what is the source of authoritative doctrine-the text of scripture alone, or
the text as glossed and supplemented by an unwritten tradition carrying
at least equal weight?13 Second, who can authoritatively interpret doc-
trine-the entire body of believers acting individually or in nonhierarchi-
cal communities, or a special hierarchical entity (such as the papacy or
curia) claiming unique interpretive competence? 14 Along both dimen-
sions, "Protestants" tend to affirm the first alternative; "Catholics," the
second.15 These religious positions, Levinson argues, map onto long-
standing debates about the Constitution. Pure constitutional "Protes-
tants" (like former Attorney General Edwin Meese) emphasize the
supremacy of constitutional text over precedent and evolving tradition;
they also challenge the notion that the Supreme Court is the exclusive
and ultimate interpreter of constitutional meaning.1 6 Pure constitutional
"Catholics" (like the younger Justice Harlan) tend to disagree along both
dimensions.1 7 To make matters even more complex and disintegrating,
one can coherently be a "Protestant" about one question and a "Catho-
lic" about the other. Indeed, Levinson identifies himself as a "Catholic"
on the source of legal authority but a "Protestant" on the locus of inter-
pretive authority.1 ' Yet Levinson does not attempt to defend in any
depth this (or any other) combination against its competitors; indeed, he
suggests that debate about such matters is Sisyphean:
It is unlikely, moreover, that any of the participants in the
debates about constitutional theory are going to have their minds




13. See pp. 18-21.
14. See pp. 23, 29.
15. See pp. 18, 29.
16. See pp. 22, 33, 39-42; Levinson, Looking at the Constitution: Could Meese Be Right This
Time?, 243 NATION 689, 706-07 (1986); Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979,
983 (1987); Devins, The Constitution Between Friends (Book Review), 67 TEXAS L. REv. 213, 213-
14 (1988).
17. Pp. 34-35.
18. P. 209 n.161.
1155
Texas Law Review
changed by reading anything by a person of another sect, any more
than Baptist theologians are likely to convert to Catholicism when
presented with a "refutation" of their position.' 9
The conclusion Levinson derives from all this is sobering:
[T]he ability of "the Constitution" to provide the unity so desper-
ately sought as a preventive against disorder depends on the resolu-
tion of the same issues that split Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and,
indeed, all other religions that have texts as a central part of their
structure.... But sophisticated legal theorists agree on none of
these premises. We are not sure of what "the Constitution" con-
sists, or how it is to be interpreted, or who is to be the authoritative
interpreter.20
In Chapter two, Levinson analyzes the moral dimension of "consti-
tutional faith." Are the commands of the Constitution necessarily
moral? How could this be so, unless we abandon morality as an in-
dependent substantive ideal and simply say that because the Constitution
commands, or permits, X, X is therefore (by definition) moral? And if
we reject this approach and acknowledge that a command might be si-
multaneously constitutional and immoral, why should we put our faith
in, and pledge our allegiance to, the Constitution?21 As Levinson points
out:
[T]his problem posed by American civil religion and its key text-
the Constitution-has its analogue in traditional religion. It can
variously be described as the problem of theodicy or of nominal-
ism; in both cases, the crucial issue concerns the relationship, if
any, between the stipulated sovereignty of God and one's defmition
of goodness, i.e., that which is worthy of moral respect. 22
For Levinson, the very idea of popular sovereignty underlying the Con-
stitution decisively severed law from morality:
"[C]onsent of the governed" shifted from being a consensual recog-
nition of a priori truths to being a more self-validating procedure
.... In the past, law was legitimate because it was based on moral
principles; in the future, law would receive its legitimacy from be-
ing the incarnation of the focused energies of the body politic.
The transition of the basis of law from principle to will has the
19. P. 52. Levinson also notes elsewhere:
Because questions of Constitution-identity are metatheoretical ... all suggested an-
swers inevitably are circular. There is simply no way of referring to "the Constitution" for
a criterion of what "the Constitution" is. Whatever the process by which understandings









effect of analytically separating law from morality .... 23
Levinson further exposes the tension between constitutional law and
morality by reminding the reader of the myriad ways in which the origi-
nal Constitution (at least, as conventionally interpreted) supported a bru-
tal regime of human slavery.24 Levinson responds to this tension by
advocating a principle of interpretive charity: whenever possible, judges
should construe the Constitution so as to render it a more morally attrac-
tive document (presumably in the judges' eyes).25 In the course of this
argument, Levinson attacks Judge Robert Bork's jurisprudence of "origi-
nal intent" as violating this principle of charity in its unwillingness to
bend the law through creative interpretation to reach a morally superior
result.26 Yet Levinson concludes by acknowledging that even the princi-
ple of interpretive charity only shrinks, but does not eliminate, the ana-
lytic gulf between law and morality. Once again, his concluding words
are sobering:
[N]ot even Ronald Dworkin insists that the Constitution can al-
ways be plausibly interpreted in an attractive manner .... [S]o long
as one rejects a complete identity between the requirements of
one's morality and those of the Constitution, it remains ill-advised
to give too much respect to the Constitution or to promote auto-
matic respect by others.2 7
Chapter three examines the role of creedal affirmation within faith
structures. Should community membership depend primarily on descent
or, alternatively, on consent and assent? Some religions, such as Juda-
ism, tend to emphasize the former-one is born a Jew-while others,
such as Christianity, focus more centrally on the latter-one becomes a
Christian by conversion and affirmation of belief.28 The Constitution
partakes of both models in defining the American community: the four-
teenth amendment establishes descent-like birthright citizenship for all
those born "in the United States,"' 29 and naturalization laws permit out-
siders to convert to American citizenship by, among other things, explic-
itly affirming their allegiance to the Constitution via loyalty oaths.30
This situation poses some puzzles for Levinson. Given the centrality of
23. P. 64.
24. See pp. 65-68.
25. See p. 88.
26. See pp. 77, 81, 86. For an explanation of Bork's theory of constitutional interpretation, see
Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, in VIEws FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY
AND CONSTTUTIONAL POLITICS 166, 171 (M. Cannon & D. O'Brien eds. 1985).
27. P. 88.
28. See pp. 90-91. Levinson notes that conversion is far less central to Judaism, which has no
propositional analogue to the Apostle's Creed. P. 91.
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1982); pp. 113-14.
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notions of consent and social contract in America, why should birth
alone confer full membership in the American political community?31
In a society lacking a strong ethnic and cultural homogeneity-like that
enjoyed by Jews (a religious community) or the French (a political com-
munity)-does mere birth in a common territory establish a sufficiently
strong set of ties to hold Americans together? Put another way, if it is
appropriate to require a naturalized citizen to take an oath in order to
vote, why is it not equally appropriate to impose the same requirement
on natives-at least if they want to vote, and thus become full members
of the American political community?32 Loyalty oaths need not neces-
sarily be viewed as illiberal and oppressive, Levinson argues; indeed, they
help give explicit content to liberal notions of the "consent of the gov-
erned."' 33 Levinson goes on to remind the reader that oaths have played
important roles in constituting both religious communities and more inti-
mate ones-such as the marriage community constituted by wedding
vows. Yet this very analogy only raises further complications, as Levin-
son notes at the chapter's end:
All political states, then, face the problem of multiple loyalties
of their citizenry; this is the price of a pluralist culture. Sometimes
the competing loyalty is to other political entities; on other occa-
sions, though, the competitors are other institutions within the so-
ciety, whether family or religious community. Generally speaking,
we do not treat these competitors equally. Thus we presumably
find understandable-and endorse-the demand made by the
United States that its new citizens repudiate their previous primary
loyalties to other countries. Yet I am quite sure that most of us
would condemn as totalitarian an explicit requirement by the
United States (or any other country) that one affirm primary loy-
alty to it over the competing loyalties of family and religion. I
believe that there is more of a problem here than the traditional
learning allows.34
Chapter four focuses on the specific content of loyalty oaths that
have been required of naturalized citizens. Once again, a powerful anal-
ogy to religion suggests itself: should the measure of one's fidelity to the
Constitution be one's inward state ("inner faith") or outward behavior
("good works")? 35 And if we focus on the latter, how can we justify
violations of the law by the greatest figures in the pantheon of American
constitutionalism-the Federalist fathers at Philadelphia and Abraham
31. See p. 104.
32. See pp. 105-06.
33. See pp. 100-01.
34. P. 119.




Lincoln, the father of the "second Constitution" ushered in after the
Civil War?36 For, according to Levinson, Father Madison and Father
Abraham engaged in much activity that was obviously illegal at the
time.37 The ratification of the Constitution was, says Levinson, " 'plainly
an extra-legal' " act in violation of the extant Articles of Confederation, 38
which served as, "in effect, our first national constitution. '39 Similarly,
Levinson suggests that Lincoln's policy of military arrests violated the
most plausible reading of the constitutional limitation on the suspension
of habeas corpus4° and that his Emancipation Proclamation was similarly
constitutionally suspect.41 Do these acts mean that these men lacked the
requisite loyalty and fidelity to the constitutions they inherited, even as
they worked to reshape our fundamental law? Moreover, does not the
very possibility of the lawful reshaping of our fundamental law-through
the provisions of article V-further complicate the notion of loyalty to
the document? Can one be considered truly "faithful" to the document if
one abhors virtually all its substantive rules but seeks to change these
rules only through the procedures of article V itself?. This last question
raises a fundamental dissimilarity between constitutional law and reli-
gion, which Levinson notes in passing:
One of the vital differences between "constitutional faith" and
more traditional religious faith is precisely the explicitly authorized
amendment process in the former. Most major Western religions
have resisted theories of "continuing revelation" that might in ef-
fect legitimize strong "amendment" of divine commandment by
persons claiming direct communication from God.42
In the final two chapters, Levinson brings the question of constitu-
36. See pp. 129-30.
37. Pp. 131, 141.
38. P. 131 (quoting Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1017 n.6 (1984)). But see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446-48
(1987) (pointing out that it was the Articles' status as a "fallen treaty" that justified the Philadelphia
Convention's proclamation that its new Constitution would take effect "among any nine states that
chose to ratify it-notwithstanding the Articles' clear requirement that all amendments to it be
unanimously adopted"); Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,
55 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1043, 1048-49 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited] (observing that
the Articles were "merely a treaty among thirteen otherwise free and independent nations").
39. P. 130. But see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 38, at 1446-48, 1455
(arguing that the Articles of Confederation were not a constitution but a confederacy or "firm league
of friendship" into which the various states entered).
40. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9; pp. 132-33.
41. See p. 141. These propositions are quite debatable, yet Levinson nowhere defends them in
any detail. Here, as elsewhere, he seems content to rely on the primary analyses of other scholars.
Given Levinson's general fondness for broad claims about indeterminacy and his belief that conven-
tions of legal argument are generally contradictory, see infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text, it
is unclear on what ground he believes Lincoln's actions in these two instances violated the "most




tional faith down to a personal level. In Chapter five, he asks what, if
any, faith in law he should be required to "profess" in order to be eligible
to be a "professor" of law. Once again, Levinson finds an analogy be-
tween law and religion useful in placing issues in context: for Levinson,
Dean Paul Carrington's recent attack on Critical Legal Studies scholars
and other "nihilists" teaching in law schools43 poses the question of
whether law schools should be more like divinity schools or religious
studies departments. 44 If the former, then perhaps would-be "profes-
sors" could legitimately be required to "profess" a "belief" in the law
before they should be allowed access to professional students who have
made at least a tentative commitment to live a life of law. (Would not a
divinity school, Levinson asks, be within its rights to protect its students
from an atheist who professed disbelief in God?45) If, on the other hand,
the more appropriate model for law schools is a religious studies depart-
ment, as Levinson argues (albeit with reservations), it becomes much eas-
ier to dismiss Carrington with a talismanic invocation of "academic
freedom.""
The concluding chapter is also deeply personal. Levinson shares his
inner struggle in deciding whether to add his own signature to the Con-
stitution, as invited by the National Park Service's bicentennial exhibit at
Philadelphia.47 Nothing external turns on this choice-there is no
outside pressure to sign in order to obtain some desired benefit, such as a
passport or the right to vote. Yet the lack of external pressure only
sharpens the internal struggle in Levinson's own mind and soul. The
image of Levinson, poised with pen in hand, and yet unsure of his best
course, is dramatic. To sign or not to sign, that is the question. His
ultimate decision to sign is perhaps less important than the reasons he
offers for the act-namely, that signing the document does not commit
him to very much at all:
The Constitution is a linguistic system, what some among us
might call a discourse. It has helped to generate a uniquely Ameri-
can form of political rhetoric that allows one to grapple with every
important political issue imaginable .... The fact that its teachings
are "indeterminate" is quite beside the point; so is any system of
language.48
Thus, for Levinson, the Constitution is
43. See Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
44. See pp. 161-62.
45. See pp. 161-62.
46. See pp. 170-71.





less a series of propositional utterances than a commitment to tak-
ing political conversation seriously. I would want to distinguish
this from an entirely "Article V" view of the Constitution, though,
because I do indeed believe that the Constitution is best understood
as supportive of such conversations and requiring a government
committed to their maintenance. Moreover, as suggested in Chap-
ter Two, what makes my faith assertion only a limited one is the
recognition that even my "best" Constitution might at times come
into conflict with what I regard as my most important moral com-
mitments; under such circumstances, it would be the Constitution
that (I hope) would give way.49
II. The Meditations of My Heart
There is much in Professor Levinson's book to meditate on, for he
raises many of the deepest questions confronting us today-as lawyers, as
scholars, as religious (non)believers, as Americans, and, most generally,
as people struggling in this world for meaning and peace. Levinson's
insights into these issues are myriad, and the connections he draws
among different sets of issues are elegant and thought-provoking. Espe-
cially impressive is the way he uses his knowledge of large bodies of
thought outside law, narrowly defined (theology, moral philosophy, liter-
ary theory) to cast new light on legal questions.
Yet there is, it seems to me, a real price to be paid for all this. In the
process of using outside disciplines to illuminate certain legal issues,
Levinson obscures other aspects of these topics-aspects well illuminated
by more conventional legal analysis. Much is surely gained, but just as
surely, something is lost, something distinctively legal. Although it is
hard to pin down precisely what that something is, two of the book's
omissions are especially striking. First, the book fails to take seriously
enough the legal process tradition that illuminates the interplay between
substantive rules governing primary conduct and process-based rules al-
locating power among different decision makers to create and interpret
those substantive rules.50 Second, it does not engage fully the myriad
conventions of legal argument that help to generate fairly determinate
legal answers to a considerable range of constitutional issues. To the ex-
tent Levinson does commit himself to certain positions in the book-he
does offer some tentative answers to the many questions he poses-these
two related omissions call those positions into doubt.
Consider, for example, Levinson's attack on Judge Bork's philoso-
49. P. 193.
50. For a more elaborate description of this legal process tradition, see Amar, Law Story, 102
HARV. L. REv. 688 (1989).
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phy of constitutional interpretation.51 Although I share Professor
Levinson's unease with many of Bork's substantive positions, Levinson's
broad-gauged attack on a jurisprudence of strict construction 2 rests in
part on an analytic cheat that blurs critical issues of legal process. To
illustrate the silliness of "literal"5 3 and mechanistic modes of judicial in-
terpretation, Levinson conjures up a hypothetical.5 4 A mother, at time
T(1), gives a babysitter express written instructions about what to do at
some future time T(3). Those instructions are emphatic that "under no
circumstances" is the babysitter to deviate from them at T(3).55 Between
T(1) and T(3), some extraordinary event, wholly unexpected by the
mother, transpires at time T(2). The event creates grave doubt whether
the mother (who cannot be reached) would continue to want her literal
instructions to be mechanically obeyed. Under these circumstances,
Levinson asks, would it not beg the question for the babysitter to assume
that any deviations from the strict words would violate the instructions,
and the true "intention" of the mother behind those instructions?56
Levinson's illustration of the difference between a rule's letter and
its spirit-a difference often sharpened by a wholly extraordinary and
unexpected event-is well taken.5 7 But does not Levinson's hypothetical
beg some obvious questions as well? Is not at least one critical question
that of who should decide whether the intervening event justifies disre-
garding the literal words of the instructions? In Levinson's hypothetical,
the answer is obviously the babysitter, because the mother presumably
cannot be reached to ask her whether she continues to desire that the
instructions be followed literally, even in light of the event at T(2). But
any easy, implied analogy between the hypothetical mother and the
founding "fathers," on the one hand, and between the hypothetical baby-
sitter and judicial "benchsitters," on the other, breaks down in a number
of ways. To begin with, as Levinson himself notes in passing elsewhere
in his book, the canon of constitutional text is not closed; new textual
instructions can be added and the specific wording of old texts altered
51. See pp. 80-87. See generally Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles] ("The judge must stick close to the
text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights."); Bork, supra note 26,
at 171-72 (asserting that a judge's sole task "is to translate the framer's or the legislator's morality
into a rule to cover unforeseen circumstances").
52. See pp. 83-84.
53. See pp. 83-84.
54. Pp. 81-82.
55. P. 82.
56. See p. 82.





through explicit amendment procedures.58 If an age-old and unchange-
able religious text is to be kept vital and meaningful in a new and ever-
changing world, creative interpretation is perhaps indispensable to avoid
ossification. If an unreachable mother's true purposes are to be respected
most deeply, a babysitter may well have to stretch the mother's words
quite far, but loose construction by judges is not similarly indispensable
to maintain the Constitution as a living document. Even if judges gener-
ally interpreted its words strictly, the document could be enlivened and
kept up-to-date by formal textual amendment. Yet Levinson never con-
siders whether the possibility of formal amendment of a text might affect
the optimal point on the continuum between strict and loose construc-
tion. Of course, the best answer may well be that the possibility of
amendment should not affect one's interpretive strategy, but Levinson
never even asks the question. Put another way, Levinson never asks
whether a different result should follow if the mother directed the baby-
sitter to follow her instructions "in all cases" at T(3), unless instructed
otherwise by the mother by phone, and the mother-although aware of
the intervening event at T(2)-nevertheless declined to phone. Given
that in constitutional law the source of all textual instructions-the peo-
ple-can be reached at all times and are free to alter the wording of their
instructions via amendment, 59 Levinson may have unfairly rigged his
chosen hypothetical in favor of loose judicial interpretation.
Further complications arise when we recognize that there is more
than one constitutional "babysitter" at T(3). Even aside from the possi-
bility of direct recourse to the people through article V or some other
mode of formal amendment, 6° which branch of government should de-
cide whether the event at T(2) is such that true fidelity to the instructions
issued by "We the People" requires deviations from the strict words We
laid down at T(1)? Bork bases his argument for judicial restraint in part
on his claim that courts should generally defer to the decisions of legisla-
tures on these matters. He explicitly roots this view, in turn, in process-
based concerns. Legislators, Bork argues, hold their offices under more
accountable and democratic (that is, majoritarian) processes of selection
and retention than do judges.61
Once again, by invoking Judge Bork's process-based arguments, I
58. See p. 152.
59. Indeed, constitutional amendments may be easier to accomplish than commentators have
generally recognized. See Ackerman, supra note 38, at 1051-70. See generally Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited, supra note 38.
60. See generally Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 38 (discussing the formal mode of
popular amendment outside article V).
61. See Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 51, at 4.
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do not mean to embrace them. As I have argued elsewhere, on legal
process grounds, legislatures are less democratic, and courts more so,
than Bork acknowledges. 62 Moreover, deference to legislatures is not
equivalent to strict fidelity to the words of the Constitution, as Bork
seems to imply. Indeed, in some situations in which legislative action
does rather plainly violate constitutional limits, legislative deference and
originalism pull in opposite directions; judges sometimes can uphold the
actions of the more "democratic" (according to Bork) legislature only by
creatively stretching the constitutional text in favor of the legislature.
Judicial restraint toward the legislature is thus different from-and often
at odds with-judicial restraint toward the framers. My quarrel with
Professor Levinson is thus not that he disagrees with Judge Bork-so do
I-but that in doing so, he ignores many of the key legal process issues
raised by lawyers like Bork and William Rehnquist.63
For Levinson, "[c]onstitutionalism, like religion, represents an at-
tempt to render an otherwise chaotic order coherent, to supply a set of
beliefs capable of channeling our conduct." 64 For legal process analysts,
however, the Constitution-unlike most religious texts-also devotes
great attention and detail to the structure of decision-making processes-
to the constitution of institutions and the demarcation of their authority.
To understand the law fully, we must not focus simply on substantive
norms-as Levinson too often does-but also on the interplay between
those norms and the procedures that create and implement them. For
example, Levinson invokes the Constitution's preamble no less than five
times, 65 but on every occasion he sees only a direct affirmation of sub-
stantive values, as embodied in words such as "liberty" and "justice."
But many of the preamble's other words-most notably its first seven
and its last seven-have large legal process implications concerning who
can create and amend substantive values, and how.66 These words un-
derscore a theory of popular sovereignty that, as I have argued else-
where, has profound ramifications for a wide range of traditional
constitutional issues of federalism, separation of powers, and constitu-
tional amendment. 67
Levinson argues that popular sovereignty "has the effect of analyti-
62. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 38, at 1076-87.
63. See generally Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAs L. REv. 693 (1976)
(presenting a constitutional theory similar to that of Bork).
64. P. 36.
65. See pp. 4, 75, 78, 130, 180.
66. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 38, at 1450-51, 1455-56.




cally separating law from morality, ' 68 but this claim once again betrays
his preoccupation with substantive results and his neglect of legal process
norms. Indeed, he elsewhere concedes that popular sovereignty does not
eliminate morality from law; it simply refocuses attention from the mo-
rality of substantive rules to the morality of procedures under which
those rules emerge.69 A principle of popular sovereignty is not,
Levinson's intimations notwithstanding, functionally equivalent to an
amoral Holmesian celebration of "dominant power." °70 First, popular
sovereignty and its corollary ideal of one person, one vote are themselves
rooted in moral principles, such as equality of all citizens (hence the rule
that no vote should count for more than any other) and the nonentrench-
ment of the status quo (hence the refusal to privilege it through
supermajority requirements).71 Second, the "right" of popular sover-
eignty need not always coincide with the "might" of dominant power.
As James Madison reminded his readers in The Federalist No. 43, a mi-
nority of voters could have a preponderance of power-economic power,
military power, and support from outside nations or people outside the
polity (including domestic nonvoters). 72 Majority rule is thus a moral
principle of right designed to constrain might.
Moreover, the right of a majority of the people, acting in conven-
tion, to alter or abolish their constitution is perhaps the most important
value (combining substance and process) embodied in the entire Consti-
tution. This renders extremely problematic Levinson's characterization
of the constitutional status of majority rule:
Majority rule is simply not the same thing as constitutional-
ism, as that concept was classically defined. One cannot under-
stand the notion of a constitution, at least prior to twentieth-
century thought, without including its role of placing limits on the
ability of majorities (or other rulers) to do whatever they wish in
regard to minorities who lose out in political struggles.73
Levinson states later in the book that "constitutionalism is an im-
portant limit to the value of majority rule precisely because it incarnates
a value hierarchically superior to majority rule." 74 If by "majority rule"
Levinson means simply rule by majorities of ordinary legislatures, I con-
cur in his judgment, though not in his wording. Ordinary legislatures are
68. P. 64.
69. P. 62.
70. But see pp. 64-65 ("[A]doption of what might be termed 'robust positivism,' where puta-
tively unjust law is privileged over the demands of justice, is not something done lightly.").
71. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 38, at 1044 n.1, 1072-76.
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mere agents of the people, and are limited in their power by restrictions
laid down by their principal (the people) in the Constitution itself.75 But
if Levinson believes that universal ideas of constitutionalism before the
twentieth century necessarily imposed sweeping restrictions on a major-
ity of the people themselves, acting directly through constitutional con-
ventions,76 his undocumented claims are wildly overstated. An
75. See p. 150.
76. After ratification of the Constitution, the relevant sovereign people was "the People of the
United States, as a whole," and not the people of each state. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
supra note 38, at 1451-62. Thus, the attempt of southern states to secede by a mere majority vote of
the people of each seceding state was unconstitutional. Id. at 1462 & n.162, 1499-1500; Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 38, at 1062 n.69, 1076.
Levinson at times seems agnostic on the constitutionality of secession, see p. 28, and at other
times appears to go even further by blaming Lincoln for the Civil War, and even implying that
Lincoln acted illegally in his refusal (backed by the executive power of the United States) to recog-
nize the lawfulness of unilateral secession, see p. 139. Here, too, Levinson's single-minded focus on
"civil religion" analogies seems to have led him astray. From the civil religion perspective, secession
might seem closely analogous to religious separatism and schism-a group of "believers" breaks
away from an old "church" to found a new one. But this analogy collapses vital differences between
emigration and secession-differences once again illuminated by the legal process perspective. Lin-
coln did not challenge the undeniable right of those disgruntled elements in the South to leave and
found their own "church." Instead, he challenged their right to bind local minorities, and to assert
sovereignty over physical territory within the United States, without the consent of a national major-
ity. The issue was not whether the "sacred ties" of nationhood could be broken, but whether seces-
sion required a national rather than a local majority-whether "dissolution" of the "wedding" of
states to each other and to the Constitution in the 1780s could occur unilaterally or required mutual
consent. Once again, the key issue, as Lincoln was at pains to emphasize in his brilliant first inaugu-
ral address, is who decides-a national majority or a national minority? See First Inaugural Address
by President Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 579, 582-83 (R. Basler ed. 1946) [hereinafter Lincoln's Inaugural Address]. (And,
of course, if each state could lawfully secede, this fact would dramatically affect the balance of
bargaining power between nation and state on ordinary issues of day-to-day politics within the
union.) Moreover, territoriality introduces further differences between secession on the one hand
and religious separatism or marital separation on the other. As Lincoln noted so eloquently, North
and South could not physically separate. See id. at 582-83. The Constitution itself recognizes this
inescapable territoriality in proclaiming itself the "supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI,
cl. 2 (emphasis added). Regional disagreements were bound to be many. For example, who would
populate and control the resource-rich West? Who would control the right to navigate the Missis-
sippi River, the commercial lifeline of the entire region between the Appalachians and the Rockies?
Such disagreements could be mediated only by law within a common Constitution or by force
outside one:
Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections
from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be
divorced, and go out of the presence, and beyond the reach of each other, but the different
parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse,
either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that
intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory, after separation than before? Can
aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully
enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot
fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease
fighting, the identical old questions, as to terms of intercourse, are again upon you.
Lincoln's Inaugural Address, supra, at 586.
Professor Levinson's expressed sentiments about secession are all the more unfortunate because
of the possibility of their misuse by a perverse "civil religion" that still seems to retain some vitality
in Texas-a civil religion that celebrates the "glorious cause" of the Confederate states, that erects
monuments to that cause, that spawns Confederate flag-waving, and that encourages social events
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important-indeed, I would argue the dominant-strand of American
constitutionalism in the late 1780s rooted constitutionalism in principles
of popular majority rule.77 The moral foundation for this vision of popu-
lar sovereignty is captured in a classical phrase that Levinson ignores but
that in fact harmonizes with his general interest in "civil religion": Vox
populi, vox Dei ("The voice of the people is the voice of God").
When we move from the issues raised by popular amendment of the
Constitution to the issues raised by the allocation of power among ordi-
nary government agents under the Constitution, a further disanalogy be-
tween the Constitution and most religious texts emerges. Once again, the
such as "Confederate balls." Indeed, I was originally moved to think and write about secession by a
conversation that I had with Professor Levinson in the spring of 1986 in Austin, Texas while stand-
ing literally in the shadow of a monument to the Confederate war dead (erected in 1901, the heyday
of Jim Crow in Texas) in front of the Texas State Capitol. Not only do I find the explicit textual
message of this monument-that Texas's right of unilateral secession was a "state right[ ] guaranteed
under the Constitution," which was simply a "federal compact"-wrong as a matter of constitu-
tional law, I find its implicit message troubling as a matter of contemporary policy. Confederate
symbols--flags, monuments, and so on-all too easily exclude large numbers of citizens, most nota-
bly blacks. The metaphoric exclusion implicit in these symbols is made concrete in the physical
exclusion associated with (almost invariably) all-white affairs such as Confederate balls. If unifying
symbols are needed, why should we pick symbols that may be hurtful to so many valued members of
the community? Certainly, the stars and bars need not be the preferred symbol of today's South any
more than a swastika should be the preferred symbol of today's Germany. (Admittedly, the compar-
ison may be overstated, yet both symbols have appeared on many flags in anti-civil rights protests
over the last three decades.) Once again, we can ask a useful legal process question in thinking about
icons of civil religion, such as flags: whose South should we be saluting-the South of unrecon-
structed whites or a new- South that seeks to include blacks on equal terms even as the region itself
seeks to be included on equal terms within the nation?
77. See, eg., Virginia Declaration of Rights art. 3 (1776), reprinted in R. RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RirHTs, 1776-1791 app. A at 231 (1955) ("[W]henever any Government
shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu-
bitable, unalienable, and indefensable right, to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be
judged most conducive to the public weal."); Virginia Report of 1799-1800, reprinted in THE VIR-
GINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800 TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21,
1798, at 189, 196 (L. Levy ed. 1970) ("The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the
sovereignty of the people over constitutions, are truths which are at all times necessary to be kept in
mind .... "); 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 432 (. Elliot 2d ed. 1907) ("As our
constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed,
the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our constitutions
control in act as well as right." (statement of James Wilson on November 20, 1787, at Pennsylvania
ratifying convention)); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[A]
majority of every national society [is] competent at all times, to alter or abolish its established gov-
ernment."); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 92 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
("[In like manner ... the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the
people of the State." (statement of Gouverneur Morris on July 23, 1787, at Philadelphia conven-
tion)); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrUTION § 327, at 297 (Boston 1833) ("[T]he
majority has at all times, a right to govern the minority .... "); id. § 337, at 306 ("[E]very individual
has surrendered to the majority of the society the right permanently to control, and direct the opera-
tions of government therein."); Roane, Hampden Essay, Richmond Enquirer, June 18, 1819, re-
printed in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 125, 130 (G. Gunther ed.
1969) ("The people only are supreme. The Constitution is subordinate to them .... ); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-




legal process tradition illuminates this dissimilarity: unlike most reli-
gious texts, the Constitution devotes considerable attention to structuring
institutions and defining their roles. The Gospel texts give little explicit
guidance on how the community of believers should govern themselves
institutionally-the word "church" appears only twice, both times in the
Gospel according to Saint Matthew78-whereas the bulk of the Constitu-
tion's text focuses on these concerns. How are government officials to be
chosen? For how long? By whom? With what possibility of renewal?
How are they to be paid? By whom? What powers can they exercise?
How are their decisions to be aggregated and coordinated with those of
other decision makers in the system? Indeed, precisely because so many
substantive norms in the Constitution are-when considered in an insti-
tutional vacuum-so open and indeterminate (as Levinson is at pains to
remind the reader), the Constitution's structural and procedural rules are
often considerably more determinate in specifying who is to resolve which
substantive issue when and subject to what kind of override by whom. 79
Levinson's view that even those legal process questions are wildly
indeterminate appears most strikingly in his discussion of "Protestant-
ism" versus "Catholicism" concerning institutional interpretive compe-
tence.80 If there are indeed two widely divergent theories of interpretive
competence within constitutional discourse-as Levinson claims-then
his faith in indeterminacy is perhaps confirmed. But Levinson is able to
suggest such a wide divergence only by (once again) blurring key legal
process distinctions. When legislators or executives give effect to their
own understandings of the Constitution by thwarting laws they deem
unconstitutional, even though they know the Supreme Court would up-
hold those laws, the situation is very different from legislative or execu-
tive disregard of a holding by the Supreme Court that a law is
unconstitutional. In effect, the Constitution structures the procedures of
the federal government to help implement its substantive restrictions on
federal power by generally giving each branch of the federal government
a constitutional veto on any law it deems unconstitutional."' None of the
constitutional "Catholics" Levinson invokes would, I think, deny the ba-
78. See Kee, The Gospel According to Matthew, in THE INTERPRETER'S ONE-VOLUME COM-
MENTARY ON THE BIBLE 609, 629 (C. Laymon ed. 1971) (noting that the Gospel texts mention
"church" only twice, in Matthew 16:18 and id. 18:17).
79. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 1I: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Juris-
diction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205, 207 & n.7, 208, 258 & n.169 (1985); Carter, ConstitutionalAdjudication
and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 865-
72 (1985).
80. See pp. 29, 35-36.
81. See Amar, supra note 79, at 222 & n.67, 223 & nn.68-69; Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federal-




sic point that a conscientious legislator can vote against a bill she deems
unconstitutional, even if she knows the Court would uphold it. Few if
any of the constitutional "Protestants" that Levinson cites would think
that there is general legal authority-absent some extraordinary national
emergency, perhaps-for the President to defy a Supreme Court decision
holding a particular practice unconstitutional. To be sure, open and in-
determinate questions remain, but the range of indeterminacy-at least
among "sophisticated legal theorists" 82 -is considerably smaller than
Levinson implies.
Nor is there as much disagreement among constitutional
"Catholics" and "Protestants" about "what 'the Constitution' consists
[of]" as Levinson implies.83 Levinson argues that "[b]ecause questions of
Constitution-identity are metatheoretical,... all suggested answers inevi-
tably are circular. There is simply no way of referring to 'the Constitu-
tion' for a criterion of what 'the Constitution' is.''84 This statement
strikes me as either trivial or wrong. If Levinson simply means that no
text is self-defining, and that a complete understanding requires context
and interpretive conventions, well and good. But if Levinson really
means to grasp the deconstructive nettle and insist, Humpty Dumpty-
like, that words can mean whatever he chooses them to mean,8 5 then I
part company. As a matter of either ordinary language conventions or
special conventions of the legal community, it is simply not the case that
all important documents in our society can be called part of the Constitu-
tion.86 Unlike the words printed in Philadelphia in 1787 and the words
added by subsequent amendments, the Gettysburg Address, Martin
Luther King's speeches, and Supreme Court opinions do not even pur-
port to locate themselves within the four comers of the Constitution.
Levinson's apparent claim that they are part of the Constitution8 7 seems
to me to be reductio ad absurdum.
But am I not being excessively nominalistic here? Even if these
other texts are not part of the Constitution itself, are they not fundamen-
tal and sacred texts, worthy of deep respect-part of our "civil religion"?
82. P. 51.
83. See p. 51.
84. P. 36.
85. Cf. L. CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND
AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) C" 'When I use a word,' Humpty
Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less.' "), quoted in P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 41
n.40 (2d ed. 1983).
86. See generally Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1427 (1986).
87. See pp. 35, 184-85.
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Of course they are, but that characterization does not mean that they are
part of the "supreme Law of the Land."' 88 Once again, Levinson's focus
only on substance and his insistence on the civil religion analogy lead
him to miss the thing that makes the Constitution itself qualitatively dif-
ferent from, and more legal than, these other texts: namely, the formal
process of popular ratification that transformed the words from cultural
symbol to supreme law.89
But is not my "Protestant" position contradicted by a rich tradition
of constitutional "Catholics," as Levinson implies? No. The only
"Catholic" jurist Levinson cites is the younger Justice Harlan,90 and
there is no indication that the great Justice thought extraconstitutional
texts were part of "the Constitution" ex proprio vigore. Instead, he sim-
ply viewed the Constitution's text as referring to things outside itself-as
do all texts.91 I know of no Justice who has denied that "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what
[the Justices] have said about it"92 (and, a fortiori, not what anyone else
has said about it or about anything else). Indeed, most Justices in this
century have joined at least one opinion explicitly saying that stare deci-
sis is accorded less weight in constitutional adjudication, lest judicial en-
crustation cover up the text itself.93
Thus far, I have argued that the radical indeterminacy on which
Levinson insists94 is significantly constrained by the substantial determi-
nacy of the Constitution's rules allocating interpretive and other power.
Moreover, indeterminacy is further constrained by extratextual conven-
tions of legal argument-rhetorical categories that channel and limit the
moves that can be made, within the law, upon a legal text. Yet here too,
Levinson's faith in the indeterminacy thesis obliges him to break free
from the constraining confines of conventional legal argument. He does
so by arguing that the conventions "are hopelessly inconsistent and con-
tradictory." 95 As to some issues-hard cases-it is surely true that dif-
88. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
89. See generally Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J.
281, 286-87 (1987) (reminding that it was popular ratification that transformed the Constitution into
binding law).
90. See pp. 34-35.
91. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Due process has
not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code.").
92. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 446, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
93. For commentary on the extent of such sentiment among Supreme Court Justices, see Bur-
net v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 n.3, 409 n.4 (1932) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Blaumstein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151, 167
(1958); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. Ray. 735, 736-37, 742-43 (1949); Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467, 467.




ferent conventions may look in different directions. It would be silly to
say that all constitutional issues are fully determinate. At some point,
there is obviously a zone of indeterminacy-of doubt and good faith de-
bate. But the issue is the relative size of that zone, and Levinson's inde-
terminacy claim is simply posited, not defended. I am not sure that
Professor Philip Bobbitt-whose own brilliant book, Constitutional
Fate,96 Levinson cites at this point 97-would agree with his colleague's
conclusion as to the hopeless inconsistency of the modalities of constitu-
tional argument. I am sure that Professor Richard Fallon-whose recent
work in this area Levinson declines to engage-would claim that in a
great range of everyday situations, the conventions of legal argument
overdetermine the best legal answer.98
Levinson's position in this indeterminacy debate cannot be persua-
sively established a priori-although Levinson at times tries99 -but can
be demonstrated only by the actual "doing of constitutional analysis," 1°°
of which there is too little in the book.
III. Benediction
The great strength of Levinson's book is its interdisciplinary fresh-
ness and creativity. But, alas, therein also lies its great weakness. This
need not have been so. Professor Levinson's other major book
(coauthored with Paul Brest) has much of Constitutional Faith's imagina-
tion, range, and insight, but is also more attentive to questions of legal
process and legal conventions, as implied by its title, Processes of Consti-
tutional Decisionmaking.101 Yet, like that earlier work, Professor Levin-
son's new book is a cause for celebration and cerebration: it is a wide-
ranging, sincere, and extraordinarily provocative work. It is a book well
worth reading, and more than once.
May it enjoy a wide audience, both within the legal community and
beyond.
Amen.
96. P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
97. P. 177.
98. See generally Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARv. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
99. See pp. 28, 125, 141, 153-54, 159, 170-78, 191.
100. P. 74.
101. P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, supra note 85.
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Disconnection: How Ma Bell Was Cut Off from
Her Young, and What to Think About It
THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM. By Peter Temint with Louis
Galambos.T Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pp.
xviii, 378. $27.95.tt
Reviewed by John B. McArthur*
We all use the phones. Most of us believe that in its years of monop-
oly, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) built the
best phone system in the world. Making a call on the Bell exchange
involved merely picking up the phone and dialing (or pushing)-no long
waits, no dead lines, no clicks followed by disconnection, and no intermi-
nable busy signals. Our phone service was cheap, easy to get, and easy to
use. The telephone became a defining characteristic of our age and trans-
formed our conception of time and distance.
Bell was the world's largest corporation.1 Bell continued to grow
relentlessly, and even enlisted the government's aid to protect its monop-
oly position, long after most of the trusts and combinations that gave rise
to the Sherman Act had lost their market dominance. Peter Temin and
Louis Galambos, the authors of The Fall of the Bell System, describe the
descent of "Ma Bell" to her position as just one of several long distance
phone companies and the transformation of her children, now suddenly
orphaned, into the seven regional companies that operate the local phone
networks. The abandonment was complete; the local companies were
forbidden by law from showing any more affection for Bell (who even
had to change her name) 2 than for her competitors. 3 The demise of the
old Bell raised the price of most local calls, dropped prices for long dis-
" Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
t Professor of History, Johns Hopkins University.
f Hereinafter cited by page or chapter number only.
* Partner, Susman, Godfrey & McGowan, Houston, Texas. B.A. 1975, Brown University;
M.A. 1978, The University of Connecticut; J.D. 1982, The University of Texas. As is not infre-
quent, my thoughts have been clarified by comments from Mark Wawro.
1. See p. 10.
2. The "Bell" name is now the exclusive property of the regional companies and cannot be
used by AT&T. Because most of us grew up using "Bell" as the name for the entire AT&T family, it
will get to keep its name here this one last time.




tance and business users, 4 created seven new Fortune 500 companies, and
provided a test for how well the Sherman Act, itself almost a hundred
years old, serves us in a harsh new international economy.
The Fall of the Bell System raises important questions about our
antitrust laws and their enforcement. Did a few people, particularly As-
sistant Attorney General William Baxter, have too much say in restruc-
turing the Bell System? Were our political institutions-particularly the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the executive
branch-afraid to decide the political questions that they dumped on the
courts? Was the judiciary the proper institution to decide the fate of our
phone system? Did divestiture make economic sense-will it lead to
lower prices and better services, or did we instead destroy the finest
flower of a natural monopoly?
Important though these questions are, The Fall of the Bell System is
often dull. The 366 pages of small-print text and footnotes wander
through a maze of acronyms, corporate restructurings, and other debris
of corporate life. At times the reading is little more exciting than review-
ing form documents from the accounting division of a multinational cor-
poration. An economist or antitrust scholar may find this material
illuminating, but this is not a book for most casual readers. Fortunately,
anyone who wants to understand the authors' basic argument without
the drudgery of reading the whole book needs only to look at two chap-
ters: Chapter six, which describes how William Baxter imposed his eco-
nomic vision on the Reagan administration and on Bell, and Chapter
eight, in which the authors summarize their views of this protracted
divestiture.
The book has another, more serious flaw. It began when Bell Chair-
man Charles Brown decided he wanted to hire outsiders to chronicle the
breakup. In principle, the authors were to remain formally independent:
"AT&T would sponsor the study and provide access to its officers and
papers, but it would not interfere with the views expressed by the au-
thor[s]." 5 Temin and Galambos state that "Brown wanted an outsider to
write the story, albeit with information from insiders."' 6 This arrange-
ment undoubtedly allowed the authors to obtain an extraordinary
amount of inside information and thus to provide readers a rare look into
Bell's corporate back room.7 But the cost seems to have been that the
4. See pp. 358-62.
5. P. xii.
6. P. xii.
7. Although Brown's impulse may reflect a charitable concern with historical accuracy, it may
also simply be in vogue for the princes of industry to leave monuments to themselves. Being a




authors fail to air views critical of Bell.
For example, the authors do not give the reasons for restructuring
Bell fair play. They fail to match their elaborate description of Bell's
growth and destruction with an equally realistic description of the anti-
trust problems that Bell caused for all would-be competitors. They por-
tray restructuring as a misfortune that Bell could have avoided with
better planning or that a smarter executive branch would have fore-
stalled. In fact, Bell's extraordinary size and absolute market power,
coupled with the lure of the growing telecommunications market, made
increased competition in some form inevitable.
Most disappointing is that The Fall of the Bell System is long on
description and short on analysis. Temin and Galambos neither evaluate
the Bell divestiture nor give their views of the antitrust laws generally.
Instead, by explaining how the principal players in the Bell drama-the
Reagan administration, the Department of Justice, and a federal judge-
did not understand the changes they were making in our economy, the
authors argue that theprocess of the Bell divestiture did not make sense.8
Temin and Galambos also describe reasons why divestiture may not
work.9 By focusing on these minor themes rather than the antitrust poli-
cies that were the real cause of divestiture, the authors suggest that Bell
should not have been dissolved. That The Fall of the Bell System bursts
with discontent over the divestiture process, while refusing to criticize
the divestiture itself, reflects Bell's own ambivalence: unhappiness at
what was lost but hope that the eight Bell companies will exploit deregu-
lation to become even more dominant than in the past.
I. Bell's Rise: The Wonder Years
The young Bell spurred its early growth by buying its competitors.
Just before the First World War, the Justice Department forced Bell to
stop acquiring companies and to sell Western Union. 10 In 1921, how-
ever, Congress passed legislation exempting Bell from antitrust restraints
imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)." Bell returned
to the market hungry for more. "Of the 234 independent companies
purchased under the ICC's jurisdiction, the Bell system acquired 223."12
Concerned with Bell's power, Congress wrote into the Communica-
Another product of the same motive is Donald Katz's recent book on Sears, D. KATZ, THE BIG
STORE (1987).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See pp. 9-11.




tions Act of 1934 a requirement that the FCC study the contracts be-
tween AT&T and its subsidiaries. 13 The FCC issued a detailed report in
1939, finding that the prices charged by Western Electric, Bell's manu-
facturing arm, bore "no reasonable relation" to its costs. 14 In response to
the FCC report, the Justice Department filed an antitrust lawsuit against
Bell after World War II. That suit was settled in the balmy business
climate of the Eisenhower administration with a 1956 consent decree
that restricted Western Electric to manufacturing telephone equipment
and Bell to providing communications services.1 5 This accommodation
stopped Bell from pushing its power into new markets, but the decree did
not limit Bell's monopoly of the phone industry.
Bell was quick to agree to the 1956 decree, because its primary goal
had always been to provide universal telephone service in the United
States. By 1956 it had largely reached that goal. Seven out of ten Ameri-
can households had phones. 16 Little more than a decade later, Bell's as-
sets of 53.3 billion dollars dwarfed those of the second largest American
corporation, Standard Oil, at 19.2 billion dollars and those of the third
largest, General Motors, at 14.2 billion dollars.17 Bel had a million em-
ployees, compared to Standard Oil's 143,000 and General Motors'
700,000.18
The main components of the Bell System in its prime were the Bell
Associated Operating Companies, which handled the local exchanges;
the Long Lines Department, which was responsible for long distance
calls; Western Electric, which made phone equipment; and Bell Labora-
tories. 19 Although Bell Labs invented many products, such as the tran-
sistor and the laser, that would have started whole new industries for
most companies, Bell remained focused on telephones.
Historically, the major problem for Bell and its regulators was how
to allocate prices between local and long distance service. Under the
pricing structure imposed by the FCC, Bell used long distance revenue to
subsidize its local phone service.20 This subsidy grew as wages, a large
13. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 211(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1073 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 211 (1982)); p. 11 & n.4.
14. See pp. 14-15 & 14 n.12.




19. See pp. 11-14.
20. Bell had traditionally split up calls "board-to-board"; the portion of a long distance call
from one company's exchange ("board") to another was long distance, but the call from the board to
the user's phone (the "station") was local. A substantial part of long distance costs were billed as
local. Pressure from the FCC and a Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S.




component of local service costs, increased while technological innova-
tions reduced the cost of long distance service.21
Regulated pricing created a large gap between long distance prices
and costs. The surplus profits available from providing long distance
services to a constantly expanding market were bound to attract competi-
tors, and they did. The pressure of competition was first reflected in a
1959 FCC consent decree that allowed competitors to offer private mi-
crowave services on high frequency lines when Bell could not provide the
same service.22 These services were extremely limited; for a long time
they could not even be shared among customers. 23
A more significant incursion into the Bell monopoly came in 1963,
when Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) applied to build a private
line between St. Louis and Chicago.24 MCI wanted its customers to be
able to use their phones to connect into MCI's private line. The FCC
approved the request, believing only a limited part of Bell's market was
at stake.25
MCI and other companies immediately flooded the FCC with appli-
cations to build private lines in other parts of the country. The FCC
decided that it could not review these applications individually. In Spe-
cialized Common Carriers,26 the most significant of its decisions about
Bell, the FCC approved the applications of specialized carriers like MCI
and allowed them to compete with Bell in the long distance market. 27
At the same time, the FCC continued to increase Bell's required
subsidy of local rates. The subsidy forced Bell to keep its long distance
prices high. By 1981, Bell's long distance revenues subsidized local ser-
vice by over seven billion dollars, an extraordinary handicap even for a
company as dominant as Bell.28
II. The Amputation
The riddle that runs through The Fall of the Bell System is whether
these competitive and regulatory pressures had to result in the breakup
tance call was a toll call from phone to phone. Revenues were separated by various formulas tied to
use. See pp. 20-23.
21. See pp. 25-26.
22. See Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359, 403-13 (1959);
pp. 29-31.
23. See p. 30.
24. See p. 47.
25. See Applications of M.C.I. for Construction Permits, 18 g F.C.C.2d 953 (1970).
26. 29 F.C.C.2d 870, aff'd sub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d
1142 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
27. See pp. 51-53.
28. See p. 357.
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of AT&T. The authors blame the inevitability of Bell's partition primar-
fly on the decisions of three men: John deButts, Harold Greene, and
William Baxter. In 1973, a year after he became Bell's chairman,
deButts delivered a major policy speech to the National Association of
Regulatory Commissioners.2 9 In that speech deButts aligned Bell firmly
with its old goal of universal service. DeButts believed that competition
was inconsistent with the regulatory goals of cheap and universal local
phone service. DeButts complained that the "contrived" competition al-
lowed by the FCC was unfair, because Bell was not allowed to compete;
he declared that Bell's "unusual obligation" was to oppose competition
and to favor regulation. 30 He asked for a "moratorium on further experi-
ments in economics" pending study of the desirability of competition in
telecommunications. 31
The authors claim that deButts hoped his speech would start a rea-
soned public debate. 32 If this claim is accurate, the speech was one of the
costliest corporate miscalculations imaginable. It was widely viewed as a
statement of defiance, and response to it was swift. Officials from the
FCC, the Department of Defense, and the Justice Department met after
the speech.3 3 The Justice Department, which had been internally circu-
lating a draft antitrust complaint against Bell since the sixties, sent Bell a
civil investigative demand.34 A year later, in November 1974, it filed the
lawsuit that would end Bell as we knew it. MCI filed its own antitrust
lawsuit against Bell in the same year.3 5
Bell took an aggressive position in the courts, but its primary focus
was on Congress. Its legislative efforts turned out to be surprisingly in-
ept for a company that had acquired and maintained its power by suc-
cessfully currying favor with regulators and politicians. Bell prepared a
bill that was a phone company fantasy. The bill would have let Bell keep
existing subsidized rates while dropping long distance prices to meet the
prices of new entrants.36 This was an attempt to maintain monopoly
prices generally but with the flexibility to cut prices just long enough to
drive out the occasional competitor. Worse, Bell introduced the bill too
late to pass in one session and failed to consult the congressman in
charge of the subcommittee that studied the bill.37 This sloppy oversight
29. See pp. 95-99.
30. See p. 97.
31. See p. 98.
32. See p. 96.
33. See p. 100.
34. See p. 101.
35. See p. 107.
36. See pp. 119-20.




ensured the legislator's continuing hostility. For the next several years,
Bell could not raise enough votes to get its bill passed, but Bell's many
supporters mobilized enough votes to kill competing bills. 38
In the meantime, the Justice Department lawsuit, which had lan-
guished in the court of an ill judge, picked up speed. The case was reas-
signed to Judge Harold Greene in 1980. Judge Greene scheduled the
case for trial in two years and indicated that he would no longer tolerate
the litigation's slow pace.39
The final catalyst for divestiture was the Reagan administration's
appointment of William Baxter as Assistant Attorney General for Anti-
trust. Because both the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General
had conflicts precluding their involvement with the litigation, Baxter be-
came the senior government official in the case.4° A free market ideo-
logue, Baxter was skeptical of regulation. He wanted to separate the
local operating companies from the parent Bell, leaving it with the verti-
cally integrated Bell Labs, Western Electric, and the long distance
services. 4 1
Baxter lacked support in the Reagan administration. Some of the
most powerful cabinet members, including Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, wanted the
case dropped. The Defense Department even drafted a study concluding
that the Justice Department misunderstood the communications busi-
ness.42 Yet no one stopped Baxter. His charmed life may be traced in
part to the lasting impact of the Dita Beard scandal, which left the Nixon
administration wounded by its intervention in the International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (ITT) merger and which made the Rea-
gan administration "eager to avoid even the appearance of impropriety"
in the Bell case.43 The quirks of history that kept Baxter's two superiors
off the case and gave Baxter free range would make some kind of divesti-
ture inevitable.
Less than a year passed from Baxter's appointment in February
1981 to the divestiture announced to a surprised public on January 8,
1982.44 Events moved inexorably to that result. Judge Greene pushed
hard against both the government and Bell. Both began to fear that their
38. See pp. 120-31.
39. See pp. 200-03.
40. See pp. 217-19.
41. See pp. 220-21.
42. See p. 227.
43. See p. 229.
44. See pp. 274-75.
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power to control the shape of a new Bell would shift by default to Judge
Greene.
Baxter, under pressure from other administration officials, sought a
continuance in July 1981 on the grounds that congressional legislation
might resolve the lawsuit.45 Judge Greene refused to delay. He made it
clear that having invoked the court's power, the government would be
bound by his decision unless the parties settled or dismissed the case.
Pressure mounted during trial after the Justice Department rested
its case. Judge Greene denied Bell's motion to dismiss in a lengthy opin-
ion in which he concluded that the evidence submitted by the govern-
ment demonstrated "that the Bell System has violated the antitrust laws
in a number of ways over a lengthy period of time."'4 Bell had recently
lost the MCI case and an antitrust lawsuit filed by Litton within a matter
of months.47 Now the company was losing the government's lawsuit and
began to worry that Judge Greene would order it to sell both Western
Electric and Bell Labs. A lawyer from Covington & Burling hired to
take a fresh look at the lawsuit agreed that Judge Greene might well find
a basis for ordering full divestiture.48
Relief from Congress seemed unlikely.49 Chairman Brown was
scheduled to testify at trial after Christmas; he planned to testify that
divestiture would be a disaster.50 This testimony would have made it
difficult, if not impossible, for him to support publicly any form of divest-
iture at a later date. Brown thus made the "biggest single decision that
an American businessman has had to make in the last century."51 He
decided that dividing the companies was inevitable; within a few days he
persuaded his board that he was right.5 2 The final details were quickly
worked up with Baxter, put down in a few pages, and formally accepted.
The authors devote a whole chapter to the details of the breakup.53
In essence, the final agreement grouped the operating companies into
seven regional companies that retained the local exchanges, pay phones,
and the Yellow Page directories.54 The parent AT&T (the operating
companies kept the Bell name as a result of pressure by Tandy Corpora-
45. See pp. 227-33.
46. P. 252.
47. See pp. 230-31.
48. See pp. 261-62.
49. The authors discuss in detail the fate of various bills introduced in Congress. See pp. 116-
31, 183-90, 235-49, 264-65, 283-87.
50. See p. 267.
51. P. 268.
52. See p. 268.
53. See ch. 7.




tion, a would-be competitor of AT&T)55 got the long distance system,
Bell Labs, and Western Electric. The operating companies had to give
other long distance carriers the same access to their exchanges that they
gave AT&T.5 6
III. Did Bell Have to Go?
The Fall of the Bell System suggests that Bill Baxter and the slow
advance of the 1974 lawsuit accomplished the destruction of Bell without
anyone having a clear idea whether divestiture made economic sense and
without any political support for the resolution of the conflict. The au-
thors only briefly mention repeated findings that Bell violated the anti-
trust laws.57 They shirk their responsibility to analyze this evidence by
stating that the book is not the place to deal with questions of "intent. '58
The only area in which the authors express an opinion on divestiture is in
their discussion of the equipment market: they do admit that "[t]he case
for competition in telecommunications equipment seems clear."'59
Temin and Galambos suggest that economists have not yet learned
how to measure economies of scale accurately. 6° This position may ex-
plain why the authors avoid giving any final opinion on whether local or
long distance phone service is best served by one company or several. In
tone, however, the authors are clearly skeptical about divestiture.61
Without a discussion of the economic effect of Bell's conduct on its
would-be competitors, it is small wonder that the events Temin and
Galambos describe appear arbitrary, as if a bureaucratic Napoleon (Bax-
ter) overwhelmed the combined forces of Bell, the government, and good
sense. The months spent researching Bell files and talking to Bell em-
ployees may have made this bias inevitable, but it diminishes the authors'
contribution.
The unavoidable fact about Bell is that it was a monopoly that grew
through acquisition and maintained its power through protective regula-
tion, self-dealing, and exclusion of competitors. Its growth was not
solely a result of efficiency and business acumen. The company acted
quickly and ruthlessly to keep competitors out of the market. For exam-
ple, when the FCC first allowed extremely limited private microwave
55. See p. 302.
56. See pp. 297-99.
57. See pp. 155, 158, 177, 231.
58. P. 251.
59. P. 354.
60. See p. 355 n.22.
61. See pp. 353-66.
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services, Bell responded by proposing its TELPAK rates.62 Bell pro-
posed to set its prices at its marginal cost. These rates could have cut
Bell's prices by up to seventh-eighths. An FCC study showed that Bell
would be getting only a 0.3 percent return on its investment at the
TELPAK prices (compared to its standard 7.5 percent return). 63 To let
Bell meet competition but keep its research base, its decades of experi-
ence (both in technology and marketing), and its unparalleled brand
identification was to guarantee that Bell would beat any competition.
The rate proposals bogged down in years of regulatory proceedings. 64
Another example of Bell's exclusionary conduct occurred with the
Carterfone, a new device that let callers use their phone receiver to acti-
vate a radio telephone message. 65 Bell first refused to let its customers
connect the Carterfone at all. Bell later modified its position and an-
nounced that it would allow an interconnection only under a "protective
coupling arrangement" (PCA) that required a customer to purchase a
special interface from Bell.66 Bell claimed to be concerned about protect-
ing the integrity of its exchanges; this concern just happened to impose
an extra cost for using non-Bell equipment. Not surprisingly, the PCA
requirement led to customer complaints, and the FCC ultimately decided
that other companies could hook up without paying any separate
charge.67
Bell's responses to MCI's growing competition in the early 1970s
provide a particularly telling example of ruthless exclusionary activity.
Bell decided to meet the MCI challenge with a differential tariff that
imposed lower rates on high density routes to approximate the prices of
MCI and other carriers. 68 Bell also tried to limit MCI's interconnection
to restricted geographic areas and to require lump-sum prepayments of
hook-up costs. 69 MCI persuaded a trial court to order Bell to allow in-
tercity connections with foreign exchanges, but when the order was re-
versed on appeal, Bell immediately shut off MCI before MCI could help
its customers make other arrangements. 70 The FCC ordered intercon-
nection one week later.71
62. See pp. 31-32.
63. See p. 38.
64. See p. 40.
65. See pp. 42-43.
66. See pp. 42, 46.
67. See pp. 63-64.
68. See pp. 76-77.
69. See p. 102.
70. See pp. 105-06.
71. See Bell System Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by Other Common




MCI was still limited to private lines. In 1974, when MCI filed for
its "Execunet" city-to-city lines (that any customer in each city could
use) the FCC ruled, after Bell's strong opposition to MCI's filing, that
this service was not authorized. 72 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed, holding that the restriction of MCI to private lines
was illegal.7 3 In a sweeping decision, Judge Wright held that the FCC
did not have authority to restrict long distance services unless it affirma-
tively found that public convenience and necessity mandated such
restrictions. 74
Bell's hostility throughout this period wreaked havoc on potential
competitors. MCI had nearly been driven into bankruptcy before new
investors took over the company in 1968 and infused it with funds. 75
The company survived because it was small, nonunion, and able to cut
every possible corner.7 6
Bell's anticompetitiveness was obvious to everyone who cared to
look. The Justice Department first sued the company for antitrust viola-
tions before World War 1.77 The FCC's 1939 study of Bell concluded
that Western Electric's prices were uncompetitive and increased the cost
of phone service.78 That study led to the second Justice Department law-
suit, which sought to separate Western Electric from Bell, and to the
1956 consent decree.79 The FCC obviously saw the need for increased
competition and gradually expanded the access of companies like MCI to
the Bell exchange. 80 A task force appointed by President Lyndon
Johnson and chaired by Eugene Rostow, a study conducted by Arthur
D. Little for Congress in 1977, a study by International Business Ma-
chines (IBM) in the same year, and a detailed industry review by Con-
gressman Timothy Wirth's staff all concluded that government should
restore competition to the telecommunications industry.81 Even a 1972
Bell-commissioned study by McKinsey & Company found that the com-
pany was not efficiently organized to serve its customers and suggested a
72. See pp. 131-33.
73. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1040 (1978); p. 134.
74. See MCI Telecommunications Corp., 561 F.2d at 374; pp. 134-35.
75. See p. 47.
76. See p. 50. In one of the more amusing anecdotes that illustrates its ability to cut comers,
MCI argued that employees in rural offices did not need restrooms because they could use surround-
ing fields. See p. 50.
77. See pp. 9-10.
78. See p. 14 nn.ll-12.
79. See pp. 14-15 & 15 n.13.
80. See pp. 54, 68, 136.
81. See pp. 53, 124 n.23, 127-28, 264.
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large number of changes, most of which were not adopted.82 Bill Baxter,
the most conservative Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in recent
years, a man with a poor record of antitrust enforcement generally 83 and
the man who dropped the IBM case on the same day that he announced
the Bell split-up, 84 agreed that the companies needed to be divided.85
Most strikingly, two juries decided after lengthy trials that Bell had
violated the antitrust laws.86 Judge Greene seemed to be well on his way
to reaching the same decision when the government's lawsuit was settled.
The MCI jury verdict was substantially affirmed in a lengthy majority
opinion that found sufficient evidence to show that Bell had unlawfully
refused to connect MCI to Bell's local exchanges, unlawfully discon-
nected MCI customers, acted anticompetitively in choosing where it
would offer interconnection, provided inadequate equipment to competi-
tors, and made sham filings with state regulatory commissions. 87 In the
government's pending antitrust action against Bell, Judge Greene dis-
missed the government's claim over anticompetitive equipment pricing,
but he found support for most of the other monopolization claims, in-
cluding monopolization in the terminal equipment market and monopoly
leveraging in Bell's refusal to connect long distance carriers to the local
exchange.88 These findings deserve more emphasis than they receive in
The Fall of the Bell System.
IV. Who Is Responsible for Divestiture?
The authors' failure to consider Bell's antitrust violations seriously
clouds their analysis of the reasons for divestiture. For instance, the au-
thors portray a few individuals as having an extraordinary impact on
Bell's demise. The prime movers are deButts, with his resolve to oppose
competition; Judge Greene, with his refusal to delay litigation; and Bax-
ter, with his resistance to other administration officials and refusal to
82. See p. 79. The company's own study of its research and development operations came to
many of the same conclusions. See g p. 81.
83. See generally Litvack, Government Antitrust Policy: Theory Versus Practice and the Role of
the Antitrust Division, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 649, 655-56 (1982) (criticizing Baxter for sacrificing the
purposes and goals of antitrust laws for the sake of maximizing economic efficiency); cf. Baxter,
Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60
TEXAS L. Rav. 661, 702-03 (1982) (defending the Reagan administration's antitrust policy of not
prosecuting violators).
84. See p. 282.
85. See pp. 220-22.
86. See pp. 340-42.
87. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1131-33, 1145-47, 1150-58 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). The special verdict is reprinted at id. at 1207-09. Bell did do
well on MCI's predatory pricing claims. The jury found the TELPAK prices lawful, and the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed the jury's finding for MCI on the "Hi-Lo" tariff. See id. at 1111-28.




waver in the face of uncertainty over trial. These three men were the
immediate causes of the divestiture, but the authors underestimate the
extent to which Bell's inherent anticompetitiveness brought on the
changes they describe. Bell's monopoly had flourished in contradiction
to the antitrust laws. The monopoly was maintained only by legislative
protection. Even then, the protection was at best an uneasy truce inter-
rupted by Justice Department lawsuits and consent decrees. Had
deButts been a more skilled politician, had the President been more
forceful, had Baxter been ineffectual, had the judge not been Judge
Greene, antitrust and economic pressures would have continued to push
Bell apart.89 Its rich markets would still beckon new competitors. Its
stable profits and sheltered position would still affront Congress and the
antitrust laws. Its exclusion of other companies from its own markets
would still raise economists' eyebrows. Strong personalities may have
determined when and how Bell was split up, but even had the coinci-
dence of history brought to power a group of equally forceful personali-
ties who preferred the status quo, it is unlikely that Bell proponents
could have done more than delay some form of divestiture.
The authors also criticize unfairly the political institutions involved
in the divestiture. They view the government as a poorly structured
group of ineffective organizations that failed to understand the damages
they were proposing. All the central institutions-the FCC, the execu-
tive branch, Congress, the courts, and, for that matter, Bell itself-were,
in the authors' portrait, overwhelmed by events outside their control.
The theme that government officials cannot make realistic plans bolsters
the authors' implicit argument that big businesses are better left alone.
The authors criticize the FCC for the naive belief that allowing a
few entrants like MCI into the market would not eventually jeopardize
Bell's larger business. 90 They contend that the FCC's decision in Special-
ized Common Carriers to let other carriers join the market ushered in "a
radical change that seems not to have been intended by most of the FCC
commissioners."91 They criticize the FCC harshly: "The Commission
embarked on a cumulative process with almost no understanding of the
forces it was setting in motion. It failed to see prices-particularly the
89. Cf. p. 351 ("It is... too much to insist that people should foresee a tangled and uncertain
future. But a more flexible approach by AT&T's leadership in the mid-1970s might have offered
room for compromise before the pressure for change reached its climax late in 1981.").
90. See, eg., p. 31 (stating that the FCC had "failed to take the company seriously" regarding
certain allegedly "self-serving" claims that turned out to have been "prescient"); pp. 50-51 (stating
that "wishful thinking" had led the FCC bureau chief to "ignore the clear signs of danger"); p. 136




gap between regulatory and competitive prices-as incentives."' 92 Even
the FCC's first step, allowing competition in private microwave services,
was "doomed to failure" because "[s]ooner or later, independent users of
private microwave systems would want to connect their systems with the
public switched network. 93
This criticism is unjustified. That competition would expand be-
yond microwave services and limited private line access was not inevita-
ble. If anything, the FCC was a victim of its own success. Competition
worked. MCI grew, and other companies joined the market. The FCC
watched and approved most of these early changes. When it later sided
with Bell in attempting to restrict full competition (a classic example of
the regulators falling prey to the charms of the regulated), it was reversed
by a court applying the earlier procompetitive policies that the FCC itself
had put at the heart of regulatory policy in Specialized Common Carriers.
The authors also give the judiciary its share of criticism, although
lawyers are likely to be pleased with the preeminence conferred upon the
courts. Temin and Galambos argue that the judicial process took an au-
tonomous course once the Bell case came before it: "[C]ourt proceed-
ings, although very much part of the political process, have acquired an
independence from interference that lets legal proceedings maintain a life
of their own."' 94 Here too the authors are critical: "[T]he independence
of the legal process is both its strength and its weakness: Judicial deci-
sion making can be swift, but it need not be informed." 95
The court emerges as a heavy-handed force pushing the trial to an
end without appreciation for the consequences. Most striking to the au-
thors is Judge Greene's refusal to continue the lawsuit when both sides
wanted more settlement talks. They quote the Judge:
"[It] is not my business if Congress wants to pass legislation to
restructure the communications industry .... I have nothing to do
with that, . . . but to say I am supposed to hold up the trial...
because in the next eleven months somebody may do something,
and this may remove an obstacle to their doing something, it
strikes me as peculiar."
... "All I can do is sit here. I didn't file the lawsuit. I didn't
pursue the lawsuit since September or November, whenever it was,
1974. I wasn't even on this court at that time. The case came here.
The case was pursued by the Department of Justice. The Depart-
ment of Justice and the Administration have seen fit not to dismiss








two and a half years of pre-trial maneuverings, and I am ready to
proceed."'96
The quotation makes Judge Greene seem more concerned with his
docket than with the national interest of more than two hundred million
Americans in their phone system.
This criticism is also unjustified, because it ignores the antitrust
problems that properly kept Judge Greene's attention. A case that ran
from 1974 to 1981 was hardly a thoughtless rush into folly. The judici-
ary is supposed to apply laws, not test the political winds, and it should
operate independently once a case comes before it. Judge Greene was
faced with a long-standing lawsuit in which the Justice Department al-
leged numerous acts of monopolization by the largest corporation in the
country. As the case proceeded, he came to believe that these allegations
were well supported. The parties had made no progress without judicial
pressure. If in the meantime Bell was injuring consumers while raking in
monopoly profits, why should the case lag? It is also unfair to criticize
Judge Greene for perceived defects in a settlement he approved but did
not create. We still do not know what his final decision would have been
(he had left for another day such core issues as Bell's regulatory preemp-
tion defense), nor do we know what remedy he would have imposed had
he found antitrust violations. The consensual settlement may have been
much harsher medicine than any relief that Judge Greene might have
imposed.
The authors question the continuing oversight now vested in Judge
Greene, contending that he "threatens to become another regulatory
agency" as he supervises divestiture.97 Yet the courts had supervised
Bell's consent decrees for years. Any restructuring of the Bell System
was bound to be complex, requiring detailed supervision, because the reg-
ulation to be undone had become so pervasive and intricate.
Temin and Galambos depict the executive branch as an incompetent
body that opposed divestiture but lacked the will to force its own lieuten-
ant, Baxter, to stop his assault on Bell. The authors cite the concern of
Bell's general counsel, Howard Trienens, that the Reagan administration
could not control its own Assistant Attorney General. 9 Such incompe-
tence on detail may, of course, be the lasting hallmark of the Reagan
administration-a sign of Ronald Reagan's personal touch. Apparently,
the only input from Reagan was an anecdote he told at a cabinet meeting:
96. Pp. 232-33 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings, Tr. 4, at 8-10, United States v. AT&T, No.
74-1698 (July 29, 1981)).
97. P. 360.
98. See p. 234.
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Reagan recalled that when he was a boy it cost two dollars to make a
cross-country call and only two cents to mail a letter and that, at the time
of his comment, the call and the letter each cost twenty cents.99 If Rea-
gan meant his comments as an instruction to leave Bell intact, he never-
theless made no other attempt to intervene with Baxter. 1°°
More revealing of the administration's incoherence was Chairman
Brown's call to Weinberger to announce the settlement. The Defense
Department had been one of Bell's major supporters, and Weinberger
had worked hard behind the scenes in attempts to convince Baxter to
drop his lawsuit. Weinberger doubtless expected more pleas for help
when he answered the phone:
Weinberger came to the phone and said that he had someone im-
portant there.
Brown replied, "Cap, I've got to talk with you."
Weinberger explained, "You know I've done all I can on this
case," and started to elaborate.
Brown interrupted. "Cap, I've settled this thing."
There was a long silence, and then Weinberger invited Brown
over to talk.101
It is extraordinary that individual government officials could have
made decisions of this magnitude without other major administration of-
ficials having some knowledge that a settlement was near, especially a
settlement that would dissolve the largest company in the country. It is
not extraordinary, however, that Baxter prevailed. Omitted from The
Fall of the Bell System is that Baxter could stand alone because he had a
strong case. Had Baxter dismissed the lawsuit, there would have been an
outcry, not because he was a bureaucrat running wild in Washington but
because his case was grounded in a sensible law that retains widespread
political support. That a top law enforcement officer pursued the law as
he saw fit is hardly grounds for criticism.
99. See pp. 229-30. The most interesting example of Reagan's management by inattention is
how Treasury Secretary Donald Regan developed tax reform, the hallmark of the Reagan adminis-
tration. Having no direction from above, Regan reviewed all the President's economic speeches to
identify the policies that he should pursue. See D. REGAN, FOR THE RECORD 142-44, 156-59
(1988). Regan decided that one appropriate policy was tax reform. Showing that he understood
how to get the President's attention, Regan did not bother making the intellectual case for reform.
Instead, he told Reagan that his secretary paid more federal taxes than sixty major corporations,
including the President's former employer, General Electric. Reagan responded, "I agree, Don, I
just didn't realize that things had gotten that far out of line." Id. at 194-95. Regan knew that this
utterance was as close as the President would get to active management, and he "interpreted his
words as an instruction to go full steam ahead with a proposal to overhaul the entire federal tax
structure." Id. at 195. Had Regan been Attorney General, he doubtless would have read Reagan's
anecdote on the price of stamps as a pointed directive to send Baxter packing back to Stanford.





Temin and Galambos put great emphasis on the role of "ideology,"
which they pass off as something akin to fickle public opinion.102 They
believe that the post-Watergate distrust of institutions and a shift in eco-
nomic ideology explain why Bell did not receive more support from the
general public. This theme grossly understates the depth of public belief
in the "ideology" that really explains the changes-the ideology embed-
ded in our antitrust laws. Bell was subject to antitrust action even during
conservative times, and its empire was finally dismantled by the most
probusiness, promerger, proconcentration administration in our history.
Bell's break-up was inevitable, even had we been spared Watergate and
Vietnam and the ideology that those two political traumas left in their
wakes.
V. Will Divestiture Work?
The question of most concern now is whether we will be better off
after divestiture. The seven operating companies that Bell brought forth
have kept their power over their markets and prospered.10 3 Fears that
they would not survive outside the nest have proved groundless. The
effect of divestiture on AT&T is less certain. The company has shrunk.
"It resembled Vienna after World War I more than West Germany after
World War II."104 Competition has intensified in the equipment and
long distance markets.
Temin and Galambos do not think that the past success of MCI is a
good predictor of whether competition will bear fruit in telecommunica-
tions. To them, the past growth of other long distance companies "car-
ries no information about the viability of competition" today. 105 This is
because MCI and the rest built their businesses on two artificial advan-
tages unavailable to Bell: they did not have to subsidize the local ex-
changes, and they could concentrate their long distance services on the
high profit, low cost urban markets.106
The authors clearly do not believe that technological advances jus-
tify the shift to competition. They note that optical fiber, a cable-based
technology like that used in the first phones, has replaced the temporary
use of microwave transmission. 107 "To the extent that the Bell System
102. See pp. 78, 337.
103. See pp. 354, 364.
104. P. 364.
105. P. 356.
106. There actually was a third subsidy; the parsimoniousness of California regulators forced the
non-California systems to subsidize Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, whose rates have
been artificially depressed for years. See p. 145.
107. See p. 347.
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was broken up to usher in the age of microwave radio, the government
forced a permanent shift in the industry's structure to take advantage of
a temporary technical opportunity-which has already been superseded
for most high-density uses."10 8 The new technology may actually in-
crease the efficiency of a single network, and AT&T may end up as the
only long distance phone company or as "the dominant member of a very
small oligopoly."10 9
One gamble of divestiture is that competition will bring innovation
and new products that more than compensate for any lost economies of
scale. The authors do admit that prices should fall and that products
should improve in the short run. 110 These benefits will go to long dis-
tance callers and business users in particular.111 But the authors fear
that Bell will have to build planned obsolescence into products that it
formerly built to last and that competition will remove the secure finan-
cial basis for Bell Labs.112 If the gains in pure research are primarily
economic externalities, the new competitors cannot be expected to fill the
shoes of Bell in the days when it was protected from competition.113 The
authors harbor great doubt about the competition between AT&T and
IBM that comforted Bill Baxter when he deregulated AT&T and set
IBM free. 14 Finally, the authors contend that any economies of scale
based on the interconnections within the Bell System will be lost.115
The future portrayed in The Fall of the Bell System is not particu-
larly attractive:
[D]ivestiture must be looked on as an enormous gamble. It is part
of a general experiment in competition as a way of organizing pre-
viously regulated industries. Telecommunications was unique
among these industries, both because of the dominance of a single
firm and because of the presence of an interactive network. Only
in the long run will we know-and possibly not even then-if the
competitive market can innovate as well as the integrated Bell
System. 116
Divestiture inevitably will increase local rates and decrease long dis-
tance charges. Bell can no longer subsidize the operating companies, and
108. P. 347.
109. P. 356.
110. See p. 362. A recent interview with Judge Greene indicates that he feels divestiture has
been an unqualified success along these lines. See Mesce, Phone System Enters a New Era, Houston
Chron., Dec. 11, 1988, § 6, at 2, col. I.
111. See p. 365.
112. See p. 359.
113. See p. 360.
114. See p. 361.




it no longer needs to. Theoretically, if the poor make mostly local calls,
they will be hurt the most (unless the new system proves so much more
efficient that even the cost of local calls is reduced). Once the move to
divest got into high gear, however, the principal actors-Judge Greene,
Baxter, and Brown-were under no pressure to weigh the benefit this
subsidy conferred on the poor against the value of a more efficient mar-
ket. Although the subsidy was always the best political justification for
Bell's monopoly, in the end neither Congress nor the executive branch
did anything to slow the movement toward divestiture.
Nothing prevents Congress, however, from imposing the same sub-
sidy on the several companies that may replace Bell. The subsidy has
always been cumbersome, and it would present little more difficulty if a
few more companies were involved. The antitrust laws should not be
held hostage to other political goals that Congress can easily achieve
through legislation, and bureaucrats charged with enforcing the antitrust
laws should not be forced to speculate about other legislative goals that
are not enshrined in statute.
The authors' worries about the future are not warranted. They
themselves show repeatedly how Bell had become unresponsive to the
needs of its customers. Much of their book is a critique of Bell's organi-
zational rigidity. 117 Bell ultimately resisted even changes its own cus-
tomers wanted. For example, when digital switching became available
for private exchanges, Bell refused to adopt the new technology, because
its engineers thought the traditional analogue switches worked just
fine.118 Bell ignored pressure from its salespeople long after it became
clear that the customers wanted digital switches.119 The company was
still run by engineers who ignored the new markets that were opening up
as telecommunications grew more sophisticated. These internal
problems are good evidence that even a smart monopolist has trouble
matching the vitality of healthy competitors. It probably is no accident
that other dominant companies of yesterday, from U.S. Steel and Gen-
eral Motors to Sears and BankAmerica, are also seeing their market
power slip from their grasp.120
Nothing in the long history recounted by Temin and Galambos
117. See pp. 57-68, 78-95, 142-75.
118. See pp. 75-76.
119. See pp. 150-51.
120. This point is brought home in two recent corporate histories, one discussing America's
largest retailer and the other discussing the bank that was once America's largest. See G. HECTOR,
BREAKING THE BANK: THE DECLINE OF BANKAMERICA 1 (1988) (describing the fall of
BankAmerica from 1980 to 1986); D. KATz, supra note 7, at viii (noting the rapid decline of Sears'
market share and stock value).
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proves that Bell deserved to be spared normal competitive pressures or
that it had earned the right to protection from the antitrust laws. The
political purpose of the antitrust laws, all but forgotten in today's make-
believe world of Chicago School economics, 121 certainly supports divesti-
ture. Bell controlled a million workers. The company was larger than
all but our largest cities. It owned a tremendous chunk of the economy.
The speculative possibility that Bell might perform better than its com-
petitors is precious little justification for governmental protection of such
an unparalleled concentration of power. It is far better to have three or
four companies with divergent interests competing for political power
than a single company with a million voters and virtually limitless
resources.
The economic benefits of divestiture point to the same conclusion.
Increased competition should lead to more and better products and to
lower prices. Consumer choice, both for phone equipment and phone
services, has already increased. The authors suggest that consumers may
be frustrated by all of their new choices. 122 But if consumers prefer not
to be confused by new services, they can stick to whatever the Bell oper-
ating companies provide. Competitors then will have to copy Bell's ex-
isting services or go out of business. The authors' paternalistic concerns
fail to justify suppressing the choices of the free market and denying con-
sumers the freedom to decide what products and services they want in
telecommunications.
Uncertainty about the future is a sign of market strength, not weak-
ness. Markets are dynamic and unfaithful. That is why the antitrust
laws articulate broad concepts that the courts must adapt to changing
market experience. The principle that the free interplay of companies
struggling to capture the highest market share leads to lower prices and
better products is the heart of modem economic theory.123 Indeed, this
principle occupies the center of much conservative thinking about anti-
trust law.124 In theory, competition improves services, lowers prices, and
quickens the imaginations of all involved. In the well-tested judgment of
the Congress that passed the Sherman Act, a judgment tempered by the
wisdom of political battle and economic suffering, economic competition
is also a necessary protector of political freedom. Any exception to the
121. For explications of Chicago School economic analysis of law, see Ackerman, Law, Econom-
ics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 940-51; Johnson, An Appeal for the
"Liberal" Use of Law and Economics: The Liberals Fight Back (Book Review), 67 TExAs L. REv.
659, 670-73 (1989).
122. See p. 362.
123. See, H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-14 (1985).




principle of competition-particularly an exception that, like the one
carved out for Bell, depends on governmental protection-should have
clear and certain justification. None appears in this book.
Bell gave us good and inexpensive phone service, but who knows
how good and inexpensive it would have been if competitors had been
allowed into the market? Now we will find out.
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